If land is titled and transferable, it can be used as collateral against which money can be borrowed. The resulting increase in access to credit is usually expected to foster economic growth. We study a policy in colonial India that made land less available as collateral for debt. Using a panel dataset for Punjab districts from 1890 to 1910, we find that this reduced the availability of mortgage-backed credit, but did not hurt proxies for economic development such as acreage and cattle, at least in the short run.
We cannot draw an indictment against half the people of India; and we may be quite sure whether we can see it or not, that we and our institutions are in the wrong, and not they.
Denzil Ibbetson 1
Introduction
In the late 19 th century the British-Indian government (the Raj) became preoccupied with default on debt and the consequent transfer of land in rural India. In many regions Raj officials made the following chain of argument. British rule had created or clarified individual property rights in land, which had for the first time made land available as collateral for debt. Peasants could now borrow up to the full value of their land. The Raj had also replaced informal village-based forms of dispute resolution with a formal legal system operating outside the village, which favored the lender rather than the borrower. Peasants were spendthrift and naïve, and unable to negotiate the new formal courts created by British rule, whereas lenders were predatory and legally savvy. 2 Borrowers were frequently defaulting, and land was rapidly passing from long-standing resident peasants to professional moneylenders who were often either immigrant, of another religion or sometimes both.
This would lead to social unrest and threaten British rule. To preserve British rule it was essential that one of the links in the chain be broken, even if this meant abandoning cherished notions of sanctity of property and contract.
3
The first major legislation motivated by this thinking, the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1879 (DARA), was a response to riots in which peasants attacked moneylenders in four districts Deputy Commissioner referred to moneylenders as "alien exploiters" who were universally regarded as "odious" (Government of India 1898, Vol. 3, p. 303) . 3 In 1895 the Government of India wrote to the various provinces of British India asking if restrictions on land transfer were warranted. Its accompanying Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India pointed out that "proposals for the protection of the landed classes from the effects of debt" had been advanced in the North-Western Provinces in 1859 and 1872-73, in Punjab in 1870, in the Deccan in the mid-1870s, by the Famine Commission of 1879-80, by the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces in 1874 and 1888, and in Burma, Bengal, Ajmer, Coorg, and Madras after 1890 (pp. 1-2). Thus in every major province of India proposals to reduce land transfers were being evaluated.
and lenders able to use various devices to evade the Act, thereby neutralizing it? 10 Second, if less credit was available, what were the effects on agricultural outcomes and hence productivity? We use panel data methods to address these questions, for the first time, so far as we know.
In addition to its contribution to research on South Asian history, our work provides evidence regarding an unusual policy experiment that is relevant to a hypothesis of broad interest.
The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has argued that while poor people are entrepreneurial, they lack capital. Though they have assets, they do not have titles to them. Given titles they can borrow against these assets and become more productive. Informed by this hypothesis, many studies estimate the effects of titling on credit and other outcomes, but they usually pertain to making assets more usable as collateral. 11 PLAA went in the opposite direction -it reduced the "collateralizability" of land. Using de Soto's logic it should have made capital less available, reducing productivity. We investigate whether it did.
Our study of PLAA also contributes to the literature on the origins of developing-country legal systems. 12 As we will describe, the Raj first decided it would not import English law pertaining to property and contract into Punjab. Due to administrative exigencies however, English law did become influential over time. PLAA was a bold effort by the Raj itself to turn the clock back, to repudiate the importation.
To identify the effects of PLAA, we assembled a panel dataset on 25 districts in Punjab from 1890 to 1910. Our dataset contains information on mortgages and sales of land, as well as economic outcomes, such as acreage and ownership of cattle, and other relevant variables like rainfall and population. Because the PLAA targeted professional moneylenders, it should have reduced 10 We discuss various ways of evading the Act in section 4, including falsification of caste (Cassan 2015) . 11 For theoretical discussion of the value of "collateralizability" of land see, for instance, Besley (1995) . While papers such as Field (2007) find large positive effects of titling on labor supply in urban Peru, others show that titling of land is not a magic bullet and increases access to credit only when certain conditions are met. For instance, it should be possible for the lender to foreclose at moderate cost. Titling may not increase access to credit if low-income borrowers are unwilling to part with their most precious asset, land. For surveys of this literature see Deininger (2003) and Sanjak (2012) . 12 La Porta et al. (2008) .
mortgage-backed credit more in places where they were bigger players in the credit market. Hence, we interact a measure of the importance of the professional, i.e., non-agricultural, moneylenders in the mortgage market with an indicator variable for the introduction of the PLAA, which takes the value 1 from 1900 onward. We find, as expected, that PLAA contracted credit more in places where professional moneylenders played a larger role-compared to a district with no professional moneylenders PLAA reduced mortgage-backed credit by 48 percentage points more at the 25 th percentile of our measure of moneylender-importance and by 61 percentage points more at the 75 th percentile.
However, this greater contraction of mortgage-backed credit in professional moneylenderdominated areas did not lead to lower acreage or less ownership of cattle. In short, PLAA affected credit markets as we might expect without undermining agricultural productivity. Because we have panel data, we are able to account for potential confounding factors such as time-invariant unobserved differences across districts (using district fixed effects), common district-specific shocks (using year effects) and the possibility that districts were trending differently independent of PLAA (using district-specific time trends). Such fixed effects and trends likely control for most omitted factors correlated with the interaction of the PLAA indicator variable and our measure of the importance of professional moneylenders.
That said, our econometric approach has one potential limitation. To the extent that PLAA had a common effect across Punjab districts, this is absorbed by the year fixed effects, and we cannot identify it. Suppose, for instance, PLAA made all lenders (non-agriculturist) or not, reluctant to lend, because the government was viewed as hostile to land transfer. The year effects would pick up this effect. We should note that as a substantive matter, we do not believe that PLAA discouraged all lenders (see below, section 4).
How do we account for non-responsiveness of real outcomes to a mortgage-backed credit contraction? In principle, one possibility is that mortgages did not really decline -they were merely disguised as sales. For instance, a 100-rupee loan at a 10% rate of interest could have been disguised as a sale of land for 100 rupees, followed by a repurchase for 110 rupees. This is not likely in our context, because the PLAA applied to all "permanent alienations", including sales. Moreover, we
show that PLAA also reduced sales more in places where professional moneylenders were more active. British officials provided the following explanation for the non-impact of PLAA on agricultural production: lenders had merely become more judicious -they were still willing to lend for productive activity, but not for "extravagant" expenditures, such as social ceremonies. A more general explanation is that though credit was a potential constraint on development, it may not have been the binding constraint at the time. In a related paper, Chaudhary and Swamy (2017) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next describes the origins of the PLAA. Section 3 describes the Act itself. We then discuss the qualitative evidence on how the Act affected credit and agricultural production in Section 4. We describe the data and our econometric analysis in Sections 5 and 6. The final section summarizes and concludes.
Leading up to the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900
In the mid-19 th century, at the point of British conquest of Punjab (1849) Despite these efforts to govern Punjab differently, it was not insulated from broader processes common to British India. Though land taxes were in principle a joint responsibility of the village landowners, they became de facto private obligations, as individuals received titles to specific plots with assigned taxes. The Raj collected land taxes in cash, whereas the last pre-colonial regime (the Sikhs) had mostly taken produce. This pushed the peasant into market transactions. The Raj was also less likely to forgive land taxes in bad times, which pushed peasants into debt. Railroads were constructed, and produce could now be sold far from the village. This further facilitated involvement in markets, with the accompanying benefits and risks. The Raj constructed canals, expanding cultivated area. Population increased. Land prices went up, and it became an attractive form of collateral for lenders.
14 One example was the Kol rebellion in Chota Nagpur in 1831-32. At one point in the conflict, the rebel army consisted of 3000 men. 15 The administration would be ma-baap, meaning mother-and-father. 16 Barrier (1966, p. 4) and lawyers were now permitted in court. In 1875 the task of dispensing justice was taken away from the executive branch of government at the district level. Cases were often adjudicated by lowerlevel judicial officers (munsifs), often urban Indians without any particular sympathy for the Punjab peasant. The application of law now became more rule-bound, with less room for "equity and good conscience". 18 Lenders preferred this system to the village-level panchayats: as shown in table 1 the number and proportion of court cases to recover money due increased rapidly.
In this setting it was inevitable that some land would pass out of the village community to professional moneylenders, especially because in many regions rainfall was low and variable, leading to fluctuation in output. This became a worry for the Raj, especially after the Mutiny of 1857. Punjab had remained loyal to the Raj during the Mutiny and many officials believed this was because of the paternalistic and flexible form of governance, which had protected the peasantry.
Moreover, the Indian army was highly dependent on Punjabi soldiers of peasant origin and the Raj wanted their loyalty. Also, Punjab was a border region, and there was always the threat from Russia.
Finally, in western Punjab Muslim peasants were in debt mostly to Hindu lenders-this could add to existing religious tensions on issues like cow protection. All these factors led some officials to raise the alarm.
In the early 1870's, Justice Melville, a Chief Court judge, called upon the government to reexamine regulations regarding debt litigation, suggesting that a dispossessed peasant becomes "a disaffected and disloyal subject". The thrifty and unembarrassed [by debt] zemindars [landowners] of this district can be counted on one's fingers. So long as a zemindari has credit, so long will he borrow, and so long as he borrows shall we find our annual returns of land-transfers slowly, but surely and steadily, increasing.
Steedman blamed this on "the misplaced gift of full transferable property right in land to the cultivator."
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In 1886, S.S. Thorburn, an official with considerable experience in western Punjab, where borrowers tended to be Muslim and lenders Hindu, wrote a sensationalist book titled Musalmans and
Moneylenders. His central hypothesis was as follows.
The Punjab is an agricultural province, and land of peasant proprietors, a large and annually increasing proportion of whom are sinking into the position of serfs to the money-lenders. The gradual transfer of ownership of the soil from its natural lords -the cultivators -to astute but uninfluential Hindu traders and bankers, is directly due to a system of law and administration created by ourselves, which, unless remedied in time, must eventually imperil the stability of our hold on the country.
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As a solution he wrote: "I would make it illegal for any person deriving profits from a shop or from money-lending, to acquire any interest in pasture or arable land…"
Other officials opposed the position taken by Melville, Steedman, and Thorburn. Melville's suggestion restricting land transfer was opposed by Lieutenant-Governor Davies on the grounds that it would "disturb natural economic relations" and "destroy the habits of self-reliance and industry."
His successor, R.E. Egerton was equally sanguine, believing that land transfers were "wholesome and necessary."
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The available evidence (see table 2) is ambiguous regarding whether land transfer to professional moneylenders was occurring on a massive scale. For instance, in the period 1879-1883, just before the publication of Thorburn's alarmist book, 1.2% of the total area was mortgaged to 20 Quoted by Banerjee (1982) , p.98, footnote 37. 21 Thorburn 1886, p. 159. 22 Thorburn also deployed anti-Semitic stereotypes, arguing that "Shylock was a gentleman by the side of Nand Lal Bunniah [bania] ." (p.37). 23 Quoted by Barrier 1965, p. 147-148. "nonagriculturists" and "new agriculturists." This is not a huge figure, but if it was sustained and a large fraction of mortgages led to foreclosure, it could have led to significant changes in the pattern of land ownership. The figures are imprecise, because of the ambiguities in the categories of "agriculturist" and "non-agriculturist." However in some specific regions of Punjab (see table 3 ), professional moneylenders were clearly acquiring a significant fraction of the land. In Gujranwala tehsil of Gujranwala district 14% of cultivated area was sold between 1868 and 1891, 60% of which was to non-agriculturists.
24 Table 4 suggests that the importance of non-agriculturist lenders was large, but was decreasing even prior to the passing of the Act. This suggests PLAA was addressing a "problem" that was becoming less significant over time. However, our sense is that the Raj was interested in more than Punjab-wide trends. Even if a large amount of land was transferred from traditional landowners to professional moneylenders in only a few areas, and this led to only localized protest or discontent, this was not a risk the Raj was willing to take.
The debate regarding land transfer was never decisively settled within Punjab officialdom. 
The Punjab Land Alienation Act
As we have described, the purpose of PLAA was to preserve status quo with respect to landownership. In particular, the intent was to prevent transfer of land from traditional landowners to professional moneylenders, after they defaulted on debt repayment. Therefore, it identified a set of social groups as "agricultural tribes" and constrained the terms in which they could mortgage their land to someone who was not from an agricultural tribe. The reader should note that, in the context of colonial Punjab, the word tribe often effectively meant caste.
24 A district consists of several tehsils. 25 The discussion among officials has been described in detail by van den Dungen (1972) .
Only three types of mortgages were permitted. In the first, the lender would take possession of the land and use it (usufructuary mortgage) for a maximum of 20 years. After that, the land would go back to the borrower and the loan would be extinguished. In the second kind, the borrower retained the right to occupy the land but he had to pay rent to the lender. This rent could be no more than twice the land tax, plus other dues owed to the government. A conventional mortgage, in which the land was used as collateral and remained in the possession of the debtor was also allowed, but if the borrower defaulted, the lender could not seize the collateral -he could only apply to the Deputy Commissioner, who would convert the agreement into a usufructuary mortgage for a term not exceeding twenty years. 26 The PLAA also banned, whether or not a member of an agricultural tribe was involved, the "conditional sale", in which the mortgaged land would automatically go to the lender if the borrower had not repaid by a specified date. Thus, whatever the form of the mortgage, the non-agriculturist lender could not get permanent possession of the agriculturist borrower's land.
As we have described earlier, for the law to have its intended effect, it also needed to ban sales from a member of an agricultural tribe to someone who was not a member. In the absence of such a ban it would have been easy to evade the restrictions on mortgages. Therefore, PLAA banned all "permanent alienation" from members of agricultural tribes to non-members, with some exceptions such as a gift to a religious institution or for charitable purpose.
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Did PLAA contract mortgage-backed credit and thereby reduce agricultural production? We now turn to qualitative evidence on these questions.
The Impact of PLAA on Credit and Agricultural Production: Qualitative Evidence
The consensus among British officials was that PLAA discouraged lending by professional moneylenders. According to an official report from 1903, there was "no doubt" that the Act had 26 Douie (1931) . 27 Singh (1901) , p. 14.
"contracted the credit of zemindars" except in some rich districts. 28 First, a professional moneylender could pretend to belong to an agricultural caste. Cassan (2015) has shown, using census data, that after PLAA was passed, the population of self-reported agricultural castes began to grow faster. He estimates that as many as 7.5% of non-agricultural caste persons pretended to be from agricultural castes. To the extent professional moneylenders adopted this strategy, they could have continued to lend as before.
Second, it is possible that after the PLAA was passed richer members of agricultural castes started to lend more. The evidence in Table 4 is consistent with this claim, though the increase in the proportion of mortgage lending by agriculturists after 1900 is small. Moreover, given Cassan's findings, we must be particularly skeptical of the accuracy of the distinction between agriculturist and non-agriculturist lenders after 1900.
Third, it was possible for a lender from a non-agricultural caste to lend with the help of an associate who was a member of an agricultural caste. The latter would, only on paper, be the lender and mortgagee. Such transactions in another person's name, known as benami, were and are common in India and the government is still trying to stamp them out. Islam (1995) Barrier (1965, p. 191 
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The general conclusions arrived at as to the working of the Act… agree with the LieutenantGovernor's own enquiries during his tours of the province. Sir Charles Rivaz thinks that it may be safely asserted that the Act has achieved its main objective of placing material checks on alienation of land without unduly impairing agricultural credit….while it has had a highly beneficial effect in the direction of curbing the natural proneness of the Punjabi zamindar to habits of profuse extravagance.
We turn next to using district-level credit and economic data to evaluate the effects of PLAA. Our control variables include the share of professional moneylenders, total rainfall and population. We rely on figures in the Registration Report for 1899-1900 to construct a measure of the importance of professional moneylenders, i.e., the share of non-agricultural moneylenders in mortgage and sale transactions in each district in 1899 just before the law is passed. 34 Since PLAA would likely affect the proportion of non-agricultural moneylenders after its passage, we construct 34 Let A = Number of mortgages and sales of agricultural land from "old" to "new" agriculturists; B = Number of mortgages and sales of land from "old" agriculturists to "old" agriculturists. Our measure of the importance of the professional moneylender is:
Data and Estimation Strategy

Data
. this variable in the year before PLAA.
We use the Punjab Land Revenue reports to collect information on total rainfall from1890 to account of more irrigation and the settling of the Canal Colonies (which we discuss below). Indeed, the summary picture likely underestimates the decline in mortgage credit caused by PLAA. Sales also decline but the aggregate value of sales increases after an initial decline immediately after the PLAA. To control for the effects of a growing economy, we turn next to the formal econometric analysis that allows us to control for temporal factors.
Empirical Strategy
To identify the effects of PLAA, we estimate the following model:
!" is an outcome in district in year . ! is an indicator, which turns to one when PLAA is passed in 1900 (and remains one thereafter) and is zero otherwise. ! is the proportion of land mortgage and sale transactions in which the mortgagee or buyer is a professional moneylender in a district as of 1899, just before the passage of PLAA. Since PLAA is passed in all districts of colonial Punjab, we cannot include the PLAA indicator variable along with year fixed effects.
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Using the interaction term allows us to use year fixed effects and still identify the heterogeneous effects of PLAA. Districts in which professional moneylenders had a larger role should have experienced a greater decline in credit following PLAA. This is akin to a difference-in-difference estimation as we are comparing districts with more professional moneylenders to those with fewer professional moneylenders before and after the passage of PLAA.
The district fixed effects, ! , control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics of districts and year fixed effects, ! , control for temporal changes, such as an improving macroeconomy, that influence all districts in the same manner. In addition, we include district time trends to control for district-specific changes over time due to factors we cannot observe. In regressions where we have data for a smaller number of years such as for cattle and implements, we do not include the trends. The vector, !" , includes as controls average rainfall, its square, population and its square. To address concerns regarding serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the districtlevel.
Most laws are passed with a few years or months of preceding discussion, which can affect outcomes even before formal legislation.. To assess the role of such dynamics, we present dynamic results including indicators for the 3-year window before PLAA, a 3-year window immediately after PLAA was passed and a long run window for years 4 and beyond. For example, if the law is passed in year 0, these indicators correspond to pre-PLAA (year -3, -2 and -1), short-run PLAA (year 0, 1 and 2), and long-run (year 3+).
Results
We begin with simple before and after regressions showing the effect of PLAA on mortgage credit and sales in Table 6 . Here we include district fixed effects, a district-specific trend and the average rainfall and population controls. In specifications (1) and (2), the PLAA coefficient is large, negative and significant for both the number and aggregate value of mortgages. PLAA reduces the number of mortgages by 59% (exp(-0.902) -1) and the aggregate value of mortgages by 60%. These are substantial effects. We observe declines in sales in specifications (3) and (4), but they are smaller in magnitudes. The number of sales declines by 19% and their aggregate value by 21%. Some British officials worried about PLAA leading to more loans disguised as sales. But these findings suggest if anything sales also declined (compared to trend) after PLAA.
In specifications (5) through (8), we study the dynamics of PLAA. Controlling for anticipation effects of the law does not change the picture. PLAA has a significant short-run effect of 59% and a long-run effect of 65% on the number of mortgages with larger effects on the value of mortgages. Similar to specifications (3) and (4), the decline in sales after PLAA are smaller. Overall, the coefficients on pre-PLAA are small and insignificant compared to the coefficients on post-PLAA.
Including district-specific trends controls for linear temporal changes in table 6, but it does not account for common year-specific shocks. So in table 7 we turn to our preferred specification, which tests for heterogeneous effects of PLAA in districts with more or less active professional moneylenders, while including district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and district-specific time trends. We focus on the interaction between PLAA and our measure of the role of professional, i.e., non-agricultural, moneylenders in specifications (1) to (4). We then explore the dynamic effects including interactions of non-agricultural moneylenders with pre-PLAA, short-run and long-run PLAA indicators in specifications (5) to (8).
We find significant differential declines in mortgage credit. At the 25 th percentile of our professional moneylenders' importance measure (46%), the number of mortgages declines by 46
percentage points more than a district where there are no professional moneylenders. The corresponding figure at the 75 th percentile of moneylender importance (61%) is 56 percentage points.
Thus, moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of professional moneylenders' share reduces mortgage credit by 10 percentage points. We find similar effects for the aggregate value of mortgages in specification (2). Unlike mortgages, we find small and insignificant coefficients on the interaction term for sales. We find similar results on the dynamics in specifications (5) to (8). Coefficients on the post-PLAA and proportion non-agricultural moneylender interactions are large, negative and significant compared to those on the pre-PLAA and proportion non-agricultural moneylender interactions for mortgage credit. And, we find no significant differential declines in sales after PLAA.
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It is possible that PLAA played out somewhat differently in Punjab's famous Canal
Colonies. In the South-Western Punjab, only the river valleys were cultivated. Between the rivers there were uplands (bar), which were sparsely populated with largely nomadic population.
36 In an additional robustness check, we interacted the PLAA dummy with the rural population share. Since the Act applied to transactions between agricultural and non-agricultural tribes, we would expect to observe more negative effects of PLAA in more rural districts. And, this is what we find with larger magnitudes for mortgages than sales. These results are available upon request.
Beginning in 1886, the Raj constructed a series of canals, bringing 2.5 million acres of bar under cultivation by 1914. 37 Settlers were brought in from densely populated areas such as central Punjab.
Because of the special circumstances the Canal Colonies had an "anomalous place in the Punjab administrative structure". 38 The Colonization Officer had enormous power. Also, in the Lower Chenab Colony (1893), the largest of them all, a category of grantees known as "peasants" only received a tenancy right, not a transferable ownership right, precisely to avoid the problem of land loss to moneylenders. 39 So we need to check whether excluding the Canal Colonies changes our results.
40 Table 8 estimates the same specifications as in Table 7 , but excludes the canal colony districts. Similar to Table 7 , we find large differential declines in mortgage credit and no significant differential declines in sales. Canal colonies are not driving the effects we observe on PLAA. If anything, the coefficients are very similar. Moving from the 25 th percentile of the professional moneylenders' distribution to the 75 th percentile, PLAA reduces the number of mortgages by 9.9
percentage points more.
We turn to agricultural outcomes in table 9. Here, we find no significant coefficients on the interaction term for most outcomes-acreage, cattle, cattle per acre and ploughs. If anything, we find a positive effect of PLAA on carts. However, it is marginally significant at the 10 percent level.
For the other outcomes, the coefficient on PLAA and the interaction term are positive and insignificant. Thus, although we find large and negative effects of PLAA on mortgage-backed credit in districts with more professional moneylenders, we find no corresponding negative effects on real outcomes.
Our results show that mortgage credit declined substantially more in areas where professional moneylenders were a relatively large part of the mortgage market. Is it possible that our 37 Douie 1914 , p. 612. 38 Barrier (1967 The other two categories of land recipients, who got more land, were known as yeomen and capitalists. 40 Ibid, p. 616. results are misleading, and driven by the fact that mortgages were disguised as other types of transactions? We have ruled out loans disguised as sales, but another way to disguise the mortgage was as a land lease -the "tenant" was the lender and his "rent" was the loan. The PLAA tried to discourage this by allowing a lease for a maximum of 20 years if the landlord was a member of an agricultural tribe and the tenant was not. 41 A land transfer could also be passed off as a gift for charity or to a religious institution. Official reports commented on these subterfuges, but noted the small number of gifts and leases, and the absence of any significant increase in their number after PLAA was passed. They concluded that leases and gifts were not significantly affecting the operation of PLAA. are for a slightly later time period than our study, but since PLAA reduced mortgages we are confident that they were an important fraction of the total credit market during 1890-1910. 42 This leaves us with the explanation offered by British officials: the primary impact of PLAA was to reduce expenditures on social ceremonies, hence there was no impact on production outcomes. For this conjecture to be plausible, there should be evidence of substantial expenditure on social ceremonies. In 1895 the Punjab government commissioned S.S. Thorburn, whose concerns regarding land alienation we have already discussed, to conduct a household survey of peasant indebtedness and land alienation in Rawalpindi division. His mandate was to pick areas where peasants were most indebted to non-agriculturists and had lost the most land. He picked 12 villages, three each in four "circles" (administrative units used land revenue assignment). Two of the circles were in Shahpur district and the other two in Sialkot and Gujranwala. He surveyed 742 households in detail. The percentage of debt due to expenditures on marriages and funerals in the four circles was 8, 8, 12 and 9. By way of comparison, the percentages of debt for the purchase of cattle were 10, 12, 15, and 8. Thus marriage and funeral expenses were substantial. The argument that productive expenditures were maintained by reducing these expenses is at least plausible. 
Conclusion
While much of the literature on India and other developing countries has focused on (lack of) access to credit as a constraint on development, another point of view has emphasized the need for appropriate allocation of capital. Anjini Kochar (2011) has shown that subsidized credit provided by the Government of India in 1980s, which was poorly allocated, had little impact on poverty.
Also, as mentioned earlier, Cole (2009) found no evidence that subsidized agricultural credit had raised productivity, and Chaudhary and Swamy (2017) find that the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act produced outcomes similar to those we have discussed here: it reduced the availability of mortgage-backed credit, but had no discernible effect on cropped acreage or investment in cattle.
42 Darling (1947) , p. 6. 43 Thorburn (1896) , p. 17. Marriages accounted for the bulk of the "unproductive" expenditures -funerals were only 1% in all four circles.
Our findings are consistent with the claims of British officials, who claimed that PLAA had not reduced lending for production but moneylenders had cut back on loans for social ceremonies and the like. These officials were echoing present-day theoretical work which suggests that lenders allocate capital better when they have more "skin in the game" i.e. the collateral is not so good that they do not have to worry about default (Manove et al. 1999 Though our study of the PLAA has focused on its short-term impact on credit markets and productivity, we should, before concluding, note other potentially long-term consequences.
Historians like Ian Talbot (1988) have argued that the PLAA had an important impact on the politics of pre-Partition Punjab. Though it provoked the predominantly Hindu moneylenders, it helped bring together Muslim and Hindu landowners in the Unionist Party, during a period in which Hindu-Muslim tension was growing.
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We should also recognize that while the PLAA presented itself as protective legislation, it also had an exclusionary aspect. While it may have prevented some landowners from becoming landless, it also prevented landless castes, who were not classified as agricultural tribes, from acquiring land. After the Partition, PLAA was declared unconstitutional in independent India. 44 Annual Report 1905-06, p. 8. 45 Ibid, p. 8. 46 As a result, the Muslim League gained influence in Punjab much later than in United Provinces.
However it remained law in Pakistani Punjab, where some scholars have argued it has helped perpetuate caste-based hierarchy. 47 Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. All regressions include average rainfall and its squared, population and its squared, district fixed effects, and district specific trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. Prop. Non-Ag ML is the proportion of non-agriculturist moneylenders, i.e. professional moneylenders. All regressions include average rainfall and its squared, population and its squared, district fixed effects and year fixed effects.
